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1. Introduction 
 
François Quesnay‟s Tableau Économique is well known and much studied (e.g., 
Kuczynski and Meek 1972, Vaggi 1987). The figures given by Quesnay in the Tableau are 
illustrative and hypothetical. They were supposed to illustrate the economic mechanism 
taking a form of a circular flow such that at the end of each period the economy and the 
agents return to the initial position. Hypothetical are various parameters assumed by 
Quesnay, as, for example, that for the equilibrium to be maintained  one-half of expenditures 
have  to be made on agricultural and one-half on manufactured goods. 
 
Less well known is that in a book by Mirabeau entitled, La philosophie rurale, 
published in 1763, Quesnay wrote Chapter VII where he undertook to draw a broadly 
plausible picture of the French economy in the mid-18
th
 century and to describe a one-shot 
(static) functioning of the economy. 
2
 He also contrasted the economies of France and 
England although his depiction of England, in the amount of detail provided, falls far short of 
France. A comprehensive numerical approach to the French economy justified the title of 
                                                          
1
 World Bank, Research Department, and School of Public Policy, University of Maryland. The paper was 
written while the author was a visiting fellow at All Souls College in Oxford.  
2
 Kuczynski and Meek (1972, p. xxxiii, note 4) write that  Quesnay‟s numbers, used in his entry “Grains” 
published in Diderot‟s and d‟Alambert‟s Encyclopaedia and which is often referenced in La Philosophie rurale , 
are indeed “estimates of the existing economic conditions.” This is also  Schumpeter‟s view; see his quote from  
Quesnay‟s Du commerce (1766): “The functioning of this trade between the different classes and its essential  
conditions are not at all hypothetical. Whoever wants to think, will see that they are faithfully copied from 
reality” (my translation from the text given in its French original by Schumpeter, 1980, pp. 232-3, note). 
2 
 
Grand Tableau Ėconomique that, according to Eltis (1975), Quesnay and Mirabeau had in 
mind before they settled on the actual title. 
3
  
 
Quesnay used realistic, albeit stylized, figures for the production levels of seven 
agricultural sectors, then included rural commerce and non-agriculture as well, and discussed 
in detail the distribution of total income into wages, entrepreneurial income, interest on 
capital, and surplus. Considerable effort was expended in presenting for each sector of the 
economy its quantitative output, costs, utilization of labor, animals and mechanical tools. It is 
very clear that the author‟s objective was to convey a picture of the French economy as it 
actually functioned. This unique source therefore allows us to glimpse a picture of a large 
predominantly agricultural European economy as it was a few decades before the French 
revolution and about half-a-century before the spread of industrialization. Moreover, and 
crucially for our objective here, it allows us to obtain both the functional income distribution 
(between labor, capital and land), and to create a social table, containing what Quesnay 
thought were the salient social classes at the time, and thus to address the issue of income 
distribution in a “rich agricultural kingdom”. A derivation of new functional and personal  
income distributions for mid-18th century France, based on a contemporary and unused 
source, is therefore the key objective of this paper.  
 
2. Process of production and factoral distribution of income 
 
Process of production.  In La philosophie rurale, the economy is divided into seven 
sectors: production of grains, wine-making (viticulture), forestry, production of fields (prés), 
mining, livestock production, and rural commerce. There are four sources of income: wages 
of workers, compensation of agricultural entrepreneurs (tenant-farmers) for their 
management, interest on capital, and rent from property of land combined with taxes. In all 
sectors tenant-farmers are also capitalists, so the class composition reduces to three: workers, 
tenant-farmers, 
4
 and property-holders (propriétaires).
5
  Property-holders receive their 
                                                          
3
 According to Cartelier (2009, p. 423) all of Chapter VII (“Les rapports des dépenses entre elles”) was written 
by Quesnay (with the exception of the first and last paragraphs written by Mirabeau).  Meek (1962, p. 278) 
draws attention to La philosophie rurale and attributes Chapter VII to Quesnay.  
4
 Perhaps that the term capitalist-farmer may be more appropriate to describe their position. Quesnay uses 
different terms: maîtres, entrepreneurs, fermiers.  
3 
 
income either because they own the land, and thus receive rent, or because they are an 
administrative or spiritual “elite” (the word never appears in Quesnay) and receive 
respectively taxes and tithes.  Property income is in principle divided into 4/7 which belong 
to landlords, 2/7 which is a tax (impôt) presumably paid for government administration, and 
1/7 which is a dîme or tithes paid to clergy (pp. 160, 171).
6
 However the three groups of 
proprietors can be, for simplicity, subsumed under the class of owners, and Quesnay does so. 
The term propriétaires is an interesting choice since it covers not only land-owners but 
administrators and priests. With some justice, one can see these “owners” as really being the 
“owners” of the country itself, a ruling elite.7 
 
It is this property income that Quesnay labels “net product” (produit net) and its 
maximization is held to be the objective of economic activity of a country. Paying laborers 
(at, or close to, subsistence), compensating entrepreneurs for their management, and 
guaranteeing a “normal” return on capital is not considered part of net product. Furthermore, 
it is only agricultural activity that, according to Quesnay produces net product: it represents 
in essence land‟s natural “bounty”. But it is wrong to remain focused on, what seems from 
today‟s perspective, Quesnay‟s strange fixation on the productivity of land only and 
“sterility” of manufacturing. The essential point, as already Marx noticed, is the existence of 
a surplus, that is of an income that is strictly speaking unnecessary to bring forth the output.
8
 
And indeed, if we take a slightly more modern approach, and assume away the compensation 
of labor and capital at “normal” and “usual” rates, then the generation of surplus is indeed 
something that the economic process is all about. It matters not that the surplus is not, as 
Quesnay thought, generated in agriculture only.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5
 In viticulture, tenant-farmers-capitalists also own land and work on it so the three factors of production are 
combined in the same person. 
6
 All the references to La philosophie rurale are based on Quesnay (2009, pp. 153-206).  
7
 The terms proprietors, property-holders and property-owners are used interchangeably.  
8
 “Though wrong in thinking that only agricultural labour is productive, the Physiocrats put forward the correct 
view that from the capitalist standpoint only that labour is productive which creates a surplus-value; and in fact 
a surplus-value not for itself, but for the owner of the conditions of production; labour which produces a net 
product not for itself, but for the landowner.” (Marx, 1969, p. 153).  And “[b]ecause agricultural labor is 
conceived as the only productive labour, the form of surplus-value which distinguishes agricultural labour from 
industrial labour, rent, is conceived as the only form of surplus-value” (p. 47; emphasis in the original).  
4 
 
The process of production takes place through short term capital  advances (avances 
annuelles) which are made by tenant-farmers. These advances are supposed to cover the cost 
of wage-labor and to defray compensation of tenant-farmers themselves. To understand them  
better, one can visualize advances as being in form of seeds, fertilizers etc. but also food and  
wage goods that need to be available both to the hired labor and to the tenant-farmers to 
cover their consumption while the process of production takes place. In addition to working 
capital, tenant-farmers also own fixed (long-term) capital in the form of livestock and 
machinery (avances primitives). Thus, tenant-farmers act both as entrepreneurs and 
capitalists: they do not borrow capital or machinery from somebody else (see e.g., Rubin, 
1979, p. 119). 
 
Quesnay frequently goes into a very great detail in his discussion of capital and its 
use. For example, the output that can be attributed to a single plough in the production of 
grain is discussed in excruciating detail (pp. 168-73).
9
 Or, in the production of wine where 
the production is done on owner-occupied plots of land, 150,000 “exploitants” are supposed, 
Quesnay writes, to own land whose average size is 10 arpents (less than 10 hectares) with 
working capital advances being on average 10 livres per arpent. Tenant-farmers receive, in all 
sectors, a return of 10 per cent annually on the value of their capital. Thus the income of 
tenant-farmers is composed of two parts: compensation for their work and management 
(where implicitly the return on working capital advance is included) and the return of 10% on 
their fixed assets.  
 
Finally, workers are supposed in all sectors to be paid at the same rate. This is not 
explicitly stated by Quesnay, but emerges when we divide total wage bill in every sector by 
the number of workers employed in it. Modern economists thus readily find in Quesnay the 
elements with which they are well acquainted: competition brings equality across sectors both 
to wages  and interest rate.   
 
                                                          
9
 “Plough” (charrue) is arguably sometimes used to mean a “plough of land”, the amount of land that can be 
tilled with one plough in a year (see Kuczynski and Meek, 1972, Notes to the “Third Edition”, Note 11, p. 4).  
But in reality the two definitions are economically interchangeable: Quesnay in either case refers to how much 
can be produced with one plough annually.  
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Total value added (total product in Quesnay‟s terminology) in sector i (VAi) can then 
be written as (1) 
 
iiiii RrKCwLVA           (1) 
 
where w=wage (equal across sectors), Li=labor employed, Ci=compensation of tenant-
farmers for their work and management (including return on advanced working capital),  r= 
rate of return on capital (equal across sectors), Ki=long-term fixed capital owned by tenant-
farmers, Ri = net product (rent, taxes and tithes) which belongs to property-holders. 
 
Three additional relationships. In addition, Quesnay imposes three additional 
relationship that will not directly have an influence on our estimation of income distribution 
across classes, but are important to understand the production side of the equation. First, 
Quesnay makes working capital advance (Ai) equal to the sum of wages and compensation of 
tenant-farmers.  The rationale for this is already explained. Thus, 
 
iii CwLA            (2) 
 
Then, he assumes that advances generate an equal amount of net product or rent (p. 
173). Quesnay needs this assumption to impose some “order” (rules) on the amount of 
surplus that would be generated by each sector. While the relationship (2) is definitional (the 
advance is needed for the process of production to take place), the relationship between 
capital advances and net product is technological and structural. For France, at her then-
existing level of technical development and fertility of soil, Quesnay assumes that 1 livre of 
advance will, in general and in the key sector of grains in particular, generate 1 livre of 
surplus. (Note that the advances are made by tenant-farmers while the rent accrues to 
property-owners, which leads to some confusion in the exposition.)  In a more developed 
environment of England, with which Quesnay deals, albeit briefly, at the end of La 
philosophie rurale, the return will be 1.5 livres on each livre of advance. So, working capital 
advance and surplus  are linked by a technological parameter β which varies between 
countries in function of their level of development and fertility of soil. 
10
 Thus, 
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 That β depends on level of development is also clear from Quesnay‟s statement in the third edition of  the 
Tableau économique that in France, at some point, advances return only 20 or 25 percent in terms of net 
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 ii RA            (3) 
 
There is finally a third, less noticed, assumption: a relationship between fixed and 
working capital (advances). In his Tableau économique, Quesnay assumed the relationship to 
be a little over 4 to 1;
11
  in “Analyse de la formule arithmetique du Tableau économique” 
(written in 1766), the relationship was 5 to 1.
12
 Here, the relationship is 4⅔ to 1 although, as 
shown in Table 1, its exact value depends on some assumptions and interpretations of 
Quesnay because the text is in parts murky and in a couple of instances even contradictory. 
Denote that relationship by γ.  We can then write the expression for the value added in (1) 
entirely as a function of working capital advances and three parameters: 
 
)1(   rAAArAVA iiiii       (4) 
  
A given advance would result in greater value added, the greater general development 
of the country or fertility of its soil (β), the greater the rate of return (r), and the greater the 
available fixed capital γ. All three quite reasonable propositions. 
 
Quesnay will not be always fully faithful to these relationships. β will be seen to vary 
between the sectors, so it too should perhaps be subscripted. The overall β  for France will be  
0.8 (compare the totals of columns 8 and 4 in Table 1) not exactly 1 as we are led to believe 
by Quesnay himself.  But as a very close shorthand to what Quesnay thinking was,  the 
equation  is correct (4): it highlights the key role of advances but also of β which, as we have 
seen, reflects the level of economic development and of γ, capital intensity of production.13 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
product, while under better administration they would yield 100 percent (see Kuczynski and Meek, 1972, Notes 
to the „Third Edition‟, Note 75. p. 16). Actually, the improvement  that a Physiocratic management of the 
economy would bring forth is measured by how much the return on working capital advance would increase.  
11
 See Kuczynski and Meek (1972, pp. v and viii). 
12
 Based on Eltis (1975, p. 173, note 2). 
13
 See a very similar derivation of the relationship in Eltis (1975, pp. 194-5). 
7 
 
These three relationships will prove useful in our reinterpretation of what Quesnay 
really meant by the “productive” sector. 
 
Incomes of various social classes.  The variability of incomes, and thus the 
emergence of a distribution of incomes across social groups (and ultimately, across 
individuals), will come almost entirely from the variability in the economic position of 
tenant-farmers. They do, from sector to sector, own various amounts of fixed and working 
capital, and although they enjoy the same rate of interest, per capita (per tenant-farmer) 
amounts received will differ. Those in more capital-rich branches will have higher incomes. 
This part is very redolent of Marx‟s prices of production: an equilibrium is possible only if 
return per unit of capital is the same for all capitalists, but the fact that various capitalists are 
unequally capital-rich will introduce differentiation in their incomes.
14
 
 
The two other classes are homogeneous: workers are  all paid the same wage rate 
(with one exception, discussed below) and so are property holders. The latter are unique in 
the sense that their total property income is “accumulated” (as it were) across sectors and 
then distributed equally to all. Their number is somewhat summarily assumed to amount to 1 
million (p. 188). Quesnay does not go into income differentiation within the class of 
property-owners.  This is unfortunate for our purposes because the top class is clearly 
heterogeneous as it must have included very rich aristocrats but also rather modest or even 
poor bureaucrats and priests. This lumping together of the “elite” represents, as we shall 
argue below, the key reason for an overall underestimation of income inequality by Quesnay.  
 
Total income is thus, in an eerily modern way, calculated both from the production 
and distribution sides. Value added of each individual sector will add up to the overall 
national value added; it would dissolve into factor incomes and these factor incomes will 
ultimately devolve to individuals or, more exactly, representative individuals from every 
social class. This is shown in Table 1. As mentioned, the production covers six agricultural 
sectors and rural commerce. These sectors are assumed to be “productive”, that is  capable of 
producing a surplus. Total value added is 5768.8 million livres (per year). It is produced by 
                                                          
14
 For a different interpretation which puts the emphasis on the monopoly of land held by property-owners, see 
Cartelier (2009, pp. 33-35). 
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more than 4.3 million agricultural workers and 653,000 tenant-farmers.  The overall ratio 
between fixed and working capital is 4.5 to 1, and it varies between the sectors. It is the 
lowest in wine production (1), and highest in rural commerce (6) and wheat production (5.7). 
The overall (fixed) capital-to-output ratio is 2.1. Again, it is the highest in commerce (5.2) 
and lowest in wine production (0.5). High capital intensity of commerce seems to be due to 
the high costs of vehicles needed for transportation of goods.  
 
Workers are all paid at the same rate of 500 livres annually with the exceptions of 
female servants (servantes de basse-cour) engaged in livestock production. 
15
 They number 
800,000 persons, and are the only group assumed not to have families to maintain. These 
800,000 female servants combined with 400,000 shepherds (bergers) make livestock 
production the second most important sector in terms of employment, following grain 
production which employs more than 1.5 million workers. In all sectors but wine production, 
this particular scheme, viz. tenant-farmers vs. workers, holds. Only in wine production, does 
Quesnay assume that the production is done by worker-owners: they do receive remuneration 
for management and return on their capital like other tenant-farmers but in addition they also 
receive wages. In the overall summation of his discussion, Quesnay (p. 188) opts to treat 
them as workers and this is the approach we follow here. Thus total income received by 
agricultural workers, as shown in Table 2 below, includes also 105 million livres that are in 
effect interest and entrepreneurial income.  
 
What is a “productive” sector? After finishing with agriculture and rural commerce, 
and as an after-thought, Quesnay introduces in a summary table of all French population (p. 
188), a new class: workers, artisans, and personal servants (domestiques) who work outside 
agriculture in the non-surplus producing (or “sterile”) sector. They are shown with their 
incomes coming from the value added produced in the non-agricultural sector. It is this 
introduction of gainful non-agricultural occupations that allows Quesnay‟s theory of surplus 
to be recast in a slightly different way. The non-agricultural sector does produce value added, 
even if it is not “productive” in Quesnay‟s sense—where being productive means generating 
a surplus for property-owners. The use of “productive” or “sterile” is thus not indicative of 
                                                          
15
 Marczewski (1965, Table 20, p. 117)  reports an INSEE estimate of the average annual wage in Paris around  
1760 (based on 300 working days) of 452 livres. Thus Quesnay‟s wage was not far off  the mark.  
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whether the sector produces value added or not, but whether the sector generates a surplus or 
not.  
 
Now, going back to relations (2)-(4) will show us why Quesnay was interested only in 
surplus-producing sectors. He viewed the working capital advance that would be simply used 
up to pay subsistence wages and compensate entrepreneurs, and the provision of a “normal” 
return on capital, as not adding anything to wealth since no surplus emerges. The key to a 
growing economy is the emergence of a surplus, that is the requirement that β be greater than 
0. In French agriculture‟s key activities (grain production, viticulture and forestry), Quesnay 
assumed, as we have seen, β=1, 16 in English grain production β is taken to be 1.5 (p. 195, 
198), and outside agriculture β is always 0. And indeed if one takes that wages must be 
always equal to the subsistence and that owners of capital must receive a “normal” return on 
their capital, there is no additional value generated in the process. We are in a state of 
Marxian “simple reproduction”.  In other words, there is no growth. It is only if there is an 
extra, a surplus, that the economy can grow. Why return on capital cannot be used for savings 
from which to finance investment is never explained by Quesnay. It could be, as argued by 
Rubin (1979), that Quesnay saw the return on capital basically as a compensation for 
depreciation and tear and wear, and not as a “net” additional income. 
 
Similarly, Quesnay did not imagine that the surplus could be used either to increase 
wages above subsistence or to pay higher profit to capitalists. He saw it as by definition 
accruing to the residual claimants, the top classes—those who are often, but not always, 
landowners. For they could also be government officials (like himself) or priests. This last 
point emerges very clearly in his treatment of viticulture, the only sector where propriétaires-
exploitants  in addition to owning fixed and working capital also own land. Were the surplus 
to be received only by landlords, they would have received it in full. However, this is not the 
case: the sector generates net product for the proprietors (see Table 1), and this net product 
logically must have been distributed in the form of taxes and tithes (p. 175).  
 
                                                          
16
 “...we assume a kingdom...where farmers maintain a rich cultivation of land which gives at least one hundred 
of net product or income for one hundred of annual advances to defray expenses” (p. 173, my translation; see 
also p. 160). 
10 
 
In his treatment of surplus as a residual income, Quesnay reaches the same point as 
Ricardo, but draws entirely different conclusions.17 While for Ricardo, the point where more 
and more of surplus accrues to landowners is occasioned by the action of diminishing returns 
and is regarded as threatening further economic growth (because landowners, unlike 
capitalists,  do not invest), Quesnay reaches that point by an institutional assumption that any 
surplus belongs to the class of owners. The existence of a large surplus, and large owners‟ 
incomes,  is thus not a negative, but positive, development for Quesnay because the very 
existence of a surplus indicates that the economy has evolved beyond hand-to-mouth 
primitive production where it is merely able to pay incomes of workers and capitalists 
directly engaged in production. Indeed, existence of a surplus is a sign of development. He 
writes: “In order to get an income from  land, agricultural work must produce a net income 
above the wages paid to workers, for it is this net product that allows other classes to exist.” 
18
 Marx (1969, p, 68) saw this point very clearly: “agricultural labour thus forms the natural 
basis…not only for surplus-labour  in its own sphere, but also for the independent existence 
of all other branches of labour, and therefore also for the surplus-value created in them.”  
Without a sufficiently high productivity in agriculture, there cannot be  development of 
manufacturing.  
 
Now, to return to the non-agricultural classes: they consist of workers, worker-owners 
and entrepreneurs, and are called gagistes (wage-earners). Quesnay divides them into two 
groups: the rich gagistes who make, on average, 2,000 livres annually (that is, four times as 
much as an agricultural worker), and poor gagistes who make exactly as much as agricultural 
workers (500 livres). The same wage rate across sectors is thus maintained even when non-
agricultural labor is introduced. Competition between laborers is implicitly assumed to hold 
across all sectors.  
 
                                                          
17 
Similarities and differences between Quesnay and Ricardo are well illustrated with respect to their position 
toward free trade. Both are in favour, but for the opposite reasons. Quesnay wants free trade so that the price of 
grain can be increased (France being a surplus producer of grain), agriculture thus becoming more attractive for 
investment and net product greater (see p. 252, Note sur la Maxime VIII). For Ricardo, free trade should bring 
about lower grain prices, reduction of nominal wages, higher profits and hence higher investments and growth.  
18
 Quesnay  (p. 265, Maximes du gouvernement, my translation).
 
11 
 
Note that in Table 1, the relationship (2), namely advances that exactly match 
workers‟ wages and compensation of tenant-farmers, holds for grain production and 
viticulture. For the other sectors, the relationship is often close but not exact. Similarly, the 
relationship (3) with β=1 holds for grain, wine production and forestry, but in field 
production, β is 5, 19 in mining β=0.4 while livestock and rural commerce do not generate any 
surplus, thus implicitly setting β to 0. In Quesnay‟s terminology, they are “sterile.”  
                                                          
19
 “The production of the fields appears therefore to require an exception in the general relationship between the 
annual advances and net product” (p. 180). The reason why production of the fields does not require high 
advances is because the work is done by workers who are already engaged elsewhere (p. 178). 
12 
 
 
Table 1. Production and distribution in La Philosophie rurale 
 Tenant-farmers Workers Property-
holders 
Output 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Income Income Capital People Income People Income Total income 
 Compensation of 
tenant-farmers 
for work and 
management (in 
million livres) 
Profit from  
capital (with 
r=10%) in 
million livres 
Total 
fixed 
capital 
(in m 
livres) 
Total 
working 
capital: 
(1)+(6) 
Number 
of tenant 
farmers 
(in 000) 
Wage 
payment 
(in million 
livres)  
Number 
of 
workers 
(in 000) 
Surplus 
(net 
product), 
in m 
livres 
Total value 
added  = 
(1)+(2)+(6)+(8) 
Grains 300 
 
608 6080 1071 250 771 1542 1071 2750 
Wine 
production 
75 
 
30 300 300 --- 225 450 300 630 
Forestry 28.8 
 
60 600 300 2/ 24 225 450 300 613.8 1/ 
Production 
of the fields 
14 24 240 50 2/ 24 50 100 250 338 
Mining  20 Included in 
compensation 
Not 
given 
200 2/ 20 200 400 80 300 
Livestock 
production 
85 3/ 
 
215 2150 385  215 4/ 200 400 Nothing 600 5/ 
Livestock 
(servants 
only) 
     100 800   
Rural 
commerce  
120 
 
240 2400 220  100 100 200 Nothing 460 6/ 
Total 642.8 1177 11770 2526 633 1871 4342 2001 5691.8 
 
13 
 
Notes to Table 1 
 
Derivation of total fixed capital in column (3) 
  
Grain production: Not explicitly mentioned in the text, but obtained as column (2) divided by the 
rate of return of 10%. 
 
Wine production: Not explicitly mentioned in the text, but obtained as column (2) divided by the 
rate of return of 10%.  The sector is composed of 150,000 proprietaires-exploitants possessing on average 
land the size of 10 arpents from which they gain a total profit of 15 million.
20
 (So the value of the land must 
be 150 million.) 300,000 independent vignerons (petites enterprises  d’exploitatation, p. 175) own as much 
land (implicitly, also worth 150 million) and receive also 15 million in return on their assets. Both of these 
classes are treated by Quesnay in the summary table (p. 188) as workers and their total number (450,000) is 
thus included in column (7).  
 
Forestry: 24,000 tenant farmers owning each a capital worth 25,000 livres.  
 
Production of the fields: 24,000 tenant-farmers owning each a capital worth 10,000 livres. 
 
Livestock: Given as “more than 2,000 million”. 
 
Rural commerce: Obtained as interest (240 million) divided by the rate of return of 10% per 
annum. 
 
1/ Quesnay gives output of 688.8 million but that number is impossible to obtain. 
2/ The advance does not exactly match the sum of wages and compensation of tenant-farmers.  
3/ Not mentioned in the text. Calculated so that total value added of 600 million be equal to wages 
(300 million), income from capital (215 million) and compensation of tenant-farmers (85 million). The last 
amount is obtained as a residual. Advances are then made equal to wages plus compensation of tenant-
farmers. 
4/ Mistakenly given as 200,000 in Quesnay‟s Table (p. 183) but the correct number of 215,000 
appears in the text (p. 184).  
5/ Total product is given as 900 million minus 600 million spent for the feeding of animals 
(intermediate consumption). However the latter amount cannot be correct because the value added would be 
less than the sum of its components. It seems likely that the intermediate consumption should be 300 
million, the same amount of intermediate consumption as assumed by the way for rural commerce.   
6/ Excluding 300 million spent for the feeding of animals (intermediate consumption).  
                                                          
20
 This part of the text (p. 175) is quite unclear because Quesnay almost implies that the profit is received from 
their annual advances (100 livres by arpent) and not from the value of the land.  
14 
 
 
Factoral income distribution. Overall factoral income distribution which includes 
incomes from agriculture (from Table 1) and incomes outside agriculture is shown in Table 2. 
Labor incomes compose 48.3 percent of total value added, interest 15.9 percent, 
entrepreneurial income (combined with management wages) another 7.9 percent, and rent, 
taxes and tithes take 27.8 percent. Of more than 8 million persons who are remunerated, just 
short of 80 percent are laborers.
21
 Two-thirds of them are employed in agriculture and one-
third outside of it.  
 
As expected, workers‟ average income is lower than the overall mean. In agriculture, 
worker‟s average income is 455 livres (less than 500 livres on account of the badly paid 
servants in livestock production, but recall that it includes also interest and entrepreneurial 
income earned in viticulture), while outside agriculture, it is 714 livres.
22
  Tenant-farmers 
earn on average more than 2,700 livres, and property-owners (pell-mell: nobility, state 
functionaries and clergy) make, on average, just a bit over 2,000.  
 
In roughest terms possible, the socio-economic structure of France circa 1760 as 
presented by Quesnay is that of a three class society. Nobility, clergy and tenant-farmers, 
accounting for approximately 20 percent of the remunerated population are rich with an 
average income in excess of  2½ times the mean. Non-agricultural workers and artisans (the 
bourgeoisie?), representing a quarter of the remunerated population, are in the middle with an 
average income slightly below the mean. Agricultural workers (more than ½ of all 
remunerated population) are on the bottom. This rough picture can be made more nuanced 
thanks to the differentiation within each of these classes that can be teased out of Quesnay‟s 
tables. To this—the creation of a social table for France around 1760—we turn  next.  
                                                          
21
 It seems more appropriate to speak of the remunerated population rather than of  the employed because some 
of those income-recipients, like landlords, are clearly not working nor looking for a  job.  
22
 Note that this does not invalidate wage equality across sectors. In agriculture, we deal with two classes of 
laborers who are unequally paid; and outside agriculture, income of workers includes entrepreneurial and capital 
income since we deal there with owner-worker production. 
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Table 2. Factoral distribution of value added and 
distribution of the remunerated population 
 
 Total 
income (in 
m livres 
p.a.) 
Share of 
total income 
(in %) 
Number of 
persons 
receiving 
that factor 
income (in 
000) 
Share of 
total 
remunerated 
population 
(in %) 
Average 
remuneration 
per person (in 
livres p.a.) 
Agricultural 
wages 
1976 27.4 4342 53.8 455.1 
Non-
agricultural 
wages 
1500 20.9 2100 26.0 714.3 
Entrepreneurial 
income 
567.8 7.9 
633 7.8 2709.0 Interest (return 
on fixed 
capital) 
1147 15.9 
Rents, taxes 
and tithes 
2001 27.8 1000 12.4 2001.0 
Total 7191.8 100 8075 100 890.6 
 
Note: Total is equal to agricultural value added from Table 1 (5691.8 million) plus non-agricultural value added 
received by gagistes (1500 million). Agricultural wages include also 105 million livres of entrepreneurial 
income and interest earned in viticulture.  
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3. Towards personal income distribution: creation of a social table 
 
Data displayed in Table 2 allow us to create a social table that has the estimated 
population sizes and average incomes by social class. In Quesnay‟s picture of France, one can 
find 12 social classes with distinct average incomes: six types of tenant-farmers who, as 
argued above, will have different incomes in function of how much capital they own; owner-
workers from viticulture; two classes of agricultural workers; two classes of non-agricultural 
laborers/self-employed, and one class of property-owners. For our purposes, it is unfortunate 
that this last class is undifferentiated because it clearly contains socially very heterogeneous 
couches (layers), from state functionaries to the nobility of various ranks and wealth to 
ecclesiastical orders who similarly covered vastly different portions of  the income 
distribution (village priests being surely in a different position than bishops and cardinals).   
 
A social table is shown in Table 3.  The first column shows the number of income-
recipients (remunerated population) from Table 2. The next column gives total population 
associated with each. Quesnay assumes a uniform family size of 4, with only one earning 
head of household. This is a very, perhaps excessively, simplifying assumption which is 
abandoned only in the case of women-servants who are supposed to be single. The 
implication of this assumption is that the employment rate is probably unrealistically low, at 
only 27 percent of the total population. The group per capita average incomes are shown in 
Column 3. The poorest three groups are all workers: servants and agricultural workers and a 
group of non-agricultural gagistes each earning 125 livres per capita annually.  
 
The next poorest group are owner-workers in wine production (183 livres per capita). 
It is interesting that they are assumed poorer than any other tenant-farmers: tenant-farmers 
average incomes range from 250 to 925 livres per capita. The latter (tenant-farmers in 
forestry) are also the richest social group. Their size however is small: only 24,000 are 
supposed to be occupied in that activity. The bulk of tenant-farmers (those in grain 
production), 250,000 of them, are  quite well-off with an average family per capita income of 
908 livres, similar to that of entrepreneurs engaged in commerce.  
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Somewhat surprisingly, property-owners, both because of their heterogeneous nature, 
and perhaps of somewhat cavalier simplifying assumption about their total income and 
particularly their numbers (1 million even), are estimated to make about 500 livres per capita 
annually which is a little over twice the mean.  
 
The overall range of incomes, expressed in terms of the mean, is 0.52 to 3.85, so that 
the top-to-bottom ratio is 7.4 to 1. The Gini coefficient is 37.4. The Lorenz curve is shown in 
Figure 1, panel a.   
 
Overall per capita income works out as 240.4 livres per year. How much above 
subsistence was it? We take the bare-bones subsistence minimum per person to be around 
400 kg of wheat-equivalent (see e.g. Scheidel and Friesen, 2009, Table 2). 
23
 Quesnay 
mentions that he assumes the price of wheat to be “the current price of wheat quoted between 
the trading nations”  (pp. 169, 194) which was 21 livres for a setier of wheat. 24A setier 
contained 240 livres de Paris the weight of each being about 490 grams. Therefore, a bare-
bones subsistence requires, in money, 72 livres annually. It follows that the average income 
was 3.3 times the subsistence. We shall consider next how that amount compares with other 
estimates of French incomes made for around the same period. 
 
 
                                                          
23
 The exact amount they give is 390 kg of wheat-equivalent (see Scheidel and Friesen, 2009, Table 2). A higher 
“respectability basket” would involve 940 kg of wheat-equivalent (ibid). One kilogram of wheat contains just  
over 3,100 calories and thus some 390-400 kg of wheat-equivalent would be, in terms of calories alone, 
sufficient for yearly survival.  
24
 The price given by Quesnay somewhat disconcertingly oscillates between 18 and 21 livres per setier (compare 
pp. 169 and 194). In a very detailed paper on wheat prices in France, Usher (1930, Table 4, p. 162), presents the 
reported prices for a setier of wheat in Albi (Provence). In the two decades 1760-1779, the prices ranged 
between 53 and 101 grams of pure silver, with the average of 80.  A livre contained then 4.5 grams of silver and 
thus the price of setier expressed in livres was about 18, not far off from Quesnay‟s figure.  
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Table 3. Social table for France around 1760, according to Quesnay  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Number 
of income 
recipients 
(in 000) 
Number 
of people 
(in 000) 
Average 
per capita 
income 
(livres, p.a.) 
Total 
income per 
group (in 
million 
livres p.a.) 
Average per 
capita income 
in terms of the 
mean 
Servants in livestock production 800 800 125 100 0.52 
Agricultural workers (outside 
viticulture) 
3092 12368 125 1546 0.52 
Poor non-agricultural workers 
(gagistes inférieurs) 
1800 7200 125 900 0.52 
Owner-workers  in viticulture 450 1800 183 330 0.76 
Tenant-farmers in mining 20 80 250 20 1.04 
Tenant-farmers in livestock 
production 
215 860 349 300 1.45 
Tenant-farmers in fields (prés) 24 96 396 38 1.65 
Rich non-agricultural workers 
(gagistes supérieurs) 
300 1200 500 600 2.08 
Property-owners 1000 4000 500.2 2001 2.08 
Entrepreneurs in commerce 100 400 900 360 3.74 
Tenant-farmers in grain 
production 
250 1000 908 908 3.78 
Tenant-farmers in forestry 24 96  925 88.8 3.85 
Total 8,075 29,900 240.4 7,191.8 1 
Note: Classes ranked by per capita income. Number of people receiving income from a given sector is 
obtained by multiplying income recipients  in column (1) by 4 (Quesnay‟s uniform assumption about 
the family size) except for the (female) servants in livestock production (servantes de basses-cour) 
who are supposed to be single. 
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4. Confrontation of  Quesnay‟s with other estimates 
 
Table 4 contrasts Quesnay‟s values with those of another contemporary writer 
(Achille Isnard, writing around 1781), and two modern estimates of French pre-revolutionary 
incomes and/or income distribution: Toutain (1987) and Morrisson and Snyder (2000). It is 
noticeable that Quesnay‟s GDP tends to be on the high side, some 20 percent greater than the 
next one by Toutain. In part, this is due to Quesnay‟s assumption of a greater population 
(almost 30 million), some 2 million in excess of what, according to Morrisson and Snyder 
(2000, p. 68) seems the currently generally accepted number for the closing decades of the 
18
th
 century. But even Quesnay‟s average per capita income is rather high. One can 
hypothesize that Quesnay‟s relatively high numbers derive from a slightly embellished 
picture of France, and in particular French agriculture. Quesnay repeatedly mentions that in 
his calculations he assumes that we are dealing with a rich, well-administered kingdom where 
prices (and hence nominal incomes) are high.
25
 High prices were, according to the 
Physiocrats, a good thing—indicative of the overall wealth, as summarized in the famous 
dictum: abondance et cherté est opulence. 
26
 So Quesnay might have erred by intention, 
representing  to his readers a French economy that could exist were the Kingdom ruled in the 
best possible manner, presumably by following Physiocratic policy principles.   
 
Consistently with this high-income, high-prices approach, Quesnay‟s bare-bones 
subsistence is also higher in nominal terms than what can be deduced from Morrisson and 
Snyder, and Isnard. The outcome of both high incomes and even higher (relatively to the 
other two authors) subsistence minimum is that Quesnay‟s estimate of French pre-
revolutionary income in terms of the subsistence minimum is lower, but within the same 
general “ballpark” as Morrisson and Snyder‟s, and Isnard‟s. The three estimates range from 
3.3 to 3.8 times the subsistence.  For England and Wales, for approximately the same period 
                                                          
25
 “One should always keep in mind that we assume a kingdom such that a good and faithful administration 
makes it flourish, where the nation lives at ease, where the essential goods are at an advantageous price, where 
the farmers maintain a rich agriculture, which yields at least one hundred of net product or revenue for each one 
hundred of annual advances or expenses” (p. 173; my translation).  For similar statements see pp. 169, 176. 
26
 Maxim XVIII (Maximes du gouvernement), p. 243. The same point is brought up by the next Maxim XIX as 
well: “One should not believe that a low price of foodstuff is good for ordinary people because low price of 
foodstuff reduces wages of people, lowers their well-being, provides them with less work and lucrative 
occupations, and destroys the treasury of a nation” (p. 243; my translation). 
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(1759), Joseph Massie‟s numbers imply an average income of 5.9 times the subsistence (see 
Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson, 2010, Table 2), thus placing England‟s per capita income  
some 70-75 percent above French. 
27
 
 
Quesnay‟s social table produces a Gini coefficient of only 37.4. In a very detailed 
recent paper on French inequality over two centuries (18
th
 and 19
th
), Morrisson and Snyder 
(2000), using a number of sources, produce a social table benchmarked in the year just before 
the revolution (1788). They divide the population in nine social classes, ranging from the 
poorest, agricultural day-laborers, to the richest, nobles and clergy. The Gini coefficient 
obtained from their social table is significantly higher, 54.6 Gini points.
28
 Isnard (1781) 
divided  the French population in eight income brackets, but, as pointed out by Morrisson and 
Snyder (2000, p. 68), left out the poorest classes, probably because his interest lay in showing 
the effect that the introduction of a flat tax would have on royal revenues. He was not 
interested in the situation of the poorest who, in any case, would not be assessed taxes. The 
Gini coefficient calculated from Isnard‟s data is 48.8.29 It is reasonable to hold that the main 
source of what could be Quesnay‟s underestimate of inequality comes from not having 
disaggregated the property-owners into at least three classes that are explicitly mentioned by 
him as belonging to that large 1 million-strong group: landlords, government administration, 
and clergy. Furthermore, it is likely that the introduction of very rich aristocrats would have 
further pushed inequality up.  
 
Using again as comparator Massie‟s social table for England and Wales for the year 
1759, we find English Gini to have been 46.
30
 Now, it is highly unlikely, as argued by 
                                                          
27
 Quesnay would have probably agreed: “The level of prosperity which we suppose [for France] is much below 
what is a reality for a nation of which we just spoke [England]” (p. 160). 
28
 Morrisson and Snyder income distribution by social group is given in their Table 3 (p.66). In the calculation 
of the Gini, we use their “high” income estimates (for the top two classes) which also yield higher inequality 
numbers.  The difference from “low” estimates however is not substantial.  In their paper (p. 80), they report a 
Gini of 59 but this seems to me to have been based on a miscalculation.  
29
 In all cases, we calculate the Gini just across social groups, assuming that inequality within each group is 
zero. This, of course, is unrealistic and imparts a downward bias to the calculated vs. the actual Gini. But we 
have no basis on which to assume what is the distribution within each social or income group in these tables. 
 
30
 See Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2010, Table 2). 
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Morrisson and Snyder (2000, p. 80), that France was at that time less unequal than England, 
and thus the reliability of Quesnay‟s Gini of 37.4 is further undermined.    
 
Figure 1 shows the Lorenz curves obtained with Quesnay‟s, Morrisson and Snyder‟s, 
and Isnard‟s  social tables.  The first contains twelve, the second nine, and the third, eight  
social classes. Despite fewer groups (and thus possibly less granular social structure) than 
Quesnay‟s, the Lorenz curve based on the Morrisson-Snyder data shows a significantly more 
unequal distribution, and particularly much lower income share of the bottom classes. Thus 
the bottom quintile in Morrisson-Snyder data receives 5  percent of total income while 
according to Quesnay its share is in excess of 10 percent.  Isnard‟s social table stands, both in 
terms of the overall inequality and the income share of the bottom, between the other two.   
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Figure 1. Lorenz curves with Quesnay‟s, Morrisson and Snyder, and Isnard‟s social tables 
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Sources: Quesnay: Table 3 above. Morrisson and Snyder (2000, Table 3). Isnard from Morrison and 
Snyder (2000, Table 5). 
 
The estimate of income distribution and average income, helps us also to situate the 
calculated Gini coefficient in its social context, viz., allows to find out how much of 
maximum feasible inequality (inequality that would exist if all population but a tiny elite 
lived at the subsistence minimum, and the elite kept the entire surplus above subsistence for 
itself) was “extracted” by the elite.  More intuitively, the inequality extraction ratio shows 
how close to the maximum feasible inequality is a society at a given point in time. With an 
23 
 
average income of about 3.3 times subsistence (according to Quesnay), the maximum feasible 
Gini is 70,
31
 and Quesnay‟s Gini of 37.4 thus “extracted” only 53 percent of maximum 
inequality. This is sizeably less than what the other two estimates imply: their inequality 
extraction ratios are 69 and 74 percent (see Table 4). The English inequality extraction ratio, 
based on Massie‟s social table for 1759, was only 55 percent, and thus noticeably lower than 
the French.
32
  The inequality extraction ratio magnifies the difference which existed between 
England and France because the higher English income implies a higher maximum feasible 
inequality. As English actual inequality, measured by the Gini, was probably less than the 
French, the ratio (actual/maximum inequality) was  even further lower.   
                                                          
31
 For the derivation and calculation of the maximum feasible inequality and the inequality extraction ratio, see 
Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson, 2010.  
32 Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2010, Table 2).   
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Table 4. Comparison between Quesnay‟s and other estimates 
 Quesnay 
(1763) 
Morrisson and 
Snyder (2000) 
Isnard 
(1781) 
Toutain 
(1987) 
Year of estimation Around 1760 1788 1781 1781-90 
Population (in 000) 29,900 27,970 24,140 27,000  
Total GDP (in m current 
livres) 
7,191.8 4,009 4,170 5,941 
GDP per capita (livres p.a.) 240 143 173 220 
Minimal per capita income (in 
livres p.a.) in social tables and 
% of population  receiving it 
125 (3%) 39 (36%) 50 (23%) n.a. 
Maximal per capita  income 
(in livres p.a.) in social tables 
and % of population  receiving 
it 
925 (0.5%) 724 (9.65%) 950 (5.5%) n.a. 
Bare-bones subsistence (in 
livres p.a.) 
72 38 50 n.a. 
GDP per capita in terms of 
subsistence (α) 
3.3 3.8 3.5 n.a. 
Share of agricultural income 
(in %) 
33.8 32.4 n.a. n.a. 
Gini coefficient 37.4 54.6 48.8 n.a. 
Maximum feasible Gini 70 74 71 n.a. 
Inequality extraction ratio (in 
%) 
53 74 69 n.a. 
 
Notes to Table 4. 
 
Sources: Quesnay (previous tables). Morrisson and Snyder: the “high case” social table in Morrisson and Snyder 
(2000, Table 3, p. 66). See also Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2010, Annexes). Isnard (1781) as reported 
in Morrisson and Snyder (2000, Table 5, p. 68). The original data come from Isnard (1781, volume 2). Toutain 
(1987): Table 1 (p. 56) and Table 12 (p. 76). 
 
Calculation of bare bones subsistence: Quesnay: 400 kg of wheat-equivalent multiplied by the price of wheat 
which is given as 21 livres per setier (1 setier = about 117.6 kg).  Morrison-Snyder: French GDP per capita in 
the year 1800 was estimated by Maddison (2004) at $PPP 1,135. The Morrisson-Snyder (2006) average income 
estimate of 143 livres per capita for the approximately same period implies that the current livre-equivalent for a 
subsistence minimum of $PPP 300  was 38 livres. This matches almost perfectly the income for the bottom class 
assumed in Morrison-Snyder social table. Isnard:  the average income of the bottom social class. 
 
Share of income received by agriculture. Quesnay: includes income of all tenant-farmers and workers in 
agriculture but not rural commerce (see Table 3). Morrisson-Snyder: includes incomes of small scale farmers, 
large scale farmers, agricultural day laborers and servants, and one-half of income of mixed workers. (Note that 
in general the output produced in agriculture will be less than the output that “remains” among those working in 
agriculture because rents are paid to landlords who are not treated as part of agriculture).    
 
Maximum feasible Gini calculated as (α-1)/α where α is GDP per capita in terms of minimum subsistence. See 
Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2010). 
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5. Conclusions and some thoughts on Quesnay‟s influence 
 
 Mirabeau‟s and Quesnay‟s La Philosophie rurale is a much less well-known work 
than Le Tableau économique (in its many different formulations) or even Maxims of M. de 
Sully. Yet all of them do compose a whole because the logic and spirit of the Tableau 
permeate La philosophie rurale. However, La philosophie rurale had an additional objective: 
to present the economy of France as it actually was, or perhaps with a slight touch of 
embellishment, how it could be made if the policies of the Physiocrats were adopted. It thus 
sharply, and for us crucially, moves from the illustrative and hypothetic arithmetic examples 
of the Tableau, from the income and money zig-zags that have left puzzled and exhausted 
generations of the economists. 
 
 But the absence of the famous ziz-zags does not make La philosophie rurale an easy 
read, even if it had some advantages over the Tableau. For example, in La philosophie rurale, 
Quesnay, for the first time to my knowledge, gives simple modern-day looking tables which 
summarize his verbal discussion of each individual sector. Toward the end of the chapter (as 
will be recalled, La philosophie rurale is the 7th chapter in the eponymous book) he provides  
two summary tables with the key results from the agricultural sector, and to the delight of the 
modern reader, even introduces the wages of those employed outside agriculture. It thus gives 
us an almost complete income distribution, broken by 12 social groups, of the mid-18th 
century France.  
 
 Quesnay does this in a strikingly modern  fashion, showing income from both 
distribution and production sides. The entire value added (both in agriculture and outside 
agriculture) is distributed between the factors of production, and then further to the rather 
well-diversified and precisely-defined social classes. Perhaps the gravest omission in the 
definition of classes is Quesnay‟s decision to treat proprietors as a single class, although they 
are composed of three functionally different “layers”: landlords, government administrators, 
and the clergy, and  must have contained people with vastly different incomes. This omission 
biases downward the Gini coefficient that is obtained from his social table, and shows 
inequality  in pre-revolutionary France some 10 to 15 Gini points less than it probably was. 
Yet the factoral distribution where some 80 percent of the population are workers and the 
share of labor income is about ½ is plausible. So is the income gap of 1.5 to 1 between urban 
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and agricultural workers. And so seems to be the share of income that accrues to landlords, 
administrators and the clergy: almost 30% even if they account for only 12 percent of the 
population.  The overall output (value added) is also close both to the contemporary and 
modern estimates.  Quesnay‟s estimate is indeed at the upper range of the GDP per capita 
values that go from 143 to 240 livres for the period preceding the French revolution, but it is 
less than 10 percent off the  very recent and detailed estimate by Toutain (1987). Moreover, 
in terms of subsistence minimum, the estimates converge to the range of 3.3 to 3.8. It is 
unfortunate that we do not have at least equally reliable numbers for a slightly more remote 
period, or more exact and frequent measurement of national income for the period just before 
the Revolution in order to try to pass a tentative judgment on a century-and-half old 
Tocqueville‟s contention that the period before the Revolution was one of  economic 
upswing.
33
  Total population estimated by Quesnay seems also to be somewhat higher than 
the modern estimates, but again the discrepancy is within 10 percent. Overall, therefore, 
Quesnay‟s description of the pre-revolutionary French economy seems to substantially agree 
with the recent estimates, and although we cannot claim for it accuracy (since we obviously 
do not know what the accurate numbers for that period really were), we can at least claim for 
it a very high degree of plausibility.  
 
 François Quesnay is not much read today which is not altogether surprising because 
the economic profession  has lost the habit (and interest) to read its classics. Thus,  he is not 
an exception. His style of course does not help his case. Reading Quesnay, even in La 
philosophie rurale, which is an easier work to read that the Tableau, is like climbing up a 
steep mounting on a day of deep fog. From time to time, the fog breaks and allows us to 
behold the beautiful landscape that lies all around us, but then the fog redescends, often with  
vengeance, and without much help from the guide (that is, from  our author), we continue the 
climb, at times despairing of ever reaching the summit or even knowing where we are going. 
The fog is not due solely to the style of the author which is indeed often dense, abstruse, and 
clumsy, but also to the numerous and complicated arithmetic examples, figures written out in 
their entirety with as many as nine zeros, calculations that are some times inexact, or have 
been made inexact by mistakes in transcription. Or even by mere forgetfulness, as when in La 
                                                          
33
 See in partricular Part III, Chapter IV in his L’ancient regime et la revolution (1856).  Incidentally, 
Toicqueville was scathingly, and probably somewhat unjustly, critical of the Physiocrats.   
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philosophie rurale’s summary table Quesnay simply forgets to include workers employed in 
rural commerce.  
 
 However, once the fog dissipates and our understanding of what Quesnay was trying 
to say  and show improves, we cannot but be amazed by the quality and modernity of the 
construction. I do not speak here of the Tableau and its famous circular flow since this was 
not the subject of this paper. But the already-mentioned double-side, production and 
distribution, approach is entirely modern. The introduction of the surplus, for which, as 
argued in the text, the assumption that it exists only in agriculture, is largely immaterial, was 
a novelty of the first order.  It is easy to see why Marx had such a high opinion of Quesnay—
reflected not only in Marx‟s schemes of reproduction which were built upon Quesnay‟s 
circular flow—but, perhaps even more importantly, because of the innovation that the idea of 
surplus represents. For only two easy steps separate Marx from Quesnay: (a) assume that 
surplus is produced in all spheres of production, and (b) assume that is produced by unpaid 
labor through the wedge which exists the value of labor-power (how much is needed to 
restore laborers, after work, back to their initial condition) and value of labor (how much 
labor produces). Instead of nature being the “fairy” thanks to whose intermediation the 
bounty of surplus arrives, it is now, in Marx, human labor which alone is capable of 
producing in ten or twelve hours of work more than its maintenance during these 10 or 12 
hours requires. It is labor, not agriculture, that yields a “bounty.”34  
 
 There is no doubt that Marx recognized this similarity, as his copious notes in the 
Theories of Surplus Value illustrate. He deals with Physiocrats in three parts of the first 
volume of  The Theories: discusses their idea of net product (surplus-value in Marx‟s 
terminology), then spends an entire chapter in often very complex discussions of the 
reproduction schemes from the Tableau, and finally presents an addendum on the Tableau 
criticizing Quesnay‟s assumptions. In total, the discussion of  the Physiocrats takes 68 
densely-printed pages (Marx, 1969, pp. 44-68; 308-350; 378-380). Compare that with just 
over a page Marshall dedicates to the Physiocrats in his Principles (1961, pp. 756-7).  
 
                                                          
34
 Schumpeter (1980, p. 238) makes a similar point although he argues that the similarity is less than it appears 
at the first sight since for Quesnay surplus was merely a physical excess over what was used in production while 
for Marx the surplus was from the very start a value surplus. I do not find this distinction quite convincing. 
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 This praise of  Marx  has provided Quesnay with enduring fascination among Marxist 
and Marxistant circles. This is, I think, obvious even from the references cited here: to 
Ronald Meek, Marguerite Kaczynski who “by means of a very brilliant piece of detective 
work”35 rediscovered and published the important “third edition” of  the Tableau in the 
German Democratic Republic in 1965, Isaac Rubin, the most famous Soviet historian of 
economic thought and an authority on Marx, Walter Eltis, and of course Schumpeter who is 
his History of Economic Analysis both ranks Quesnay very highly and explains, perceptively 
as ever, why Quesnay was not given sufficient recognition by other economists:  
 
It has been remarked...that Quesnay...has to this day been receiving less than 
his due as a scientific economist..Especially that kind of recognition—the only 
serious one—that consists in the acknowledgment by competent workers of 
obligation, or at least of priority, in definite points, has been dealt out to him 
rather sparingly. One reason for this was that his analytic work was little 
understood and that in consequence later economists actually did not owe as 
much to him as some might think. Another was the presence in his teaching of 
what people felt to be an element of oddity. In A. Smith, both reasons seem to 
have been operative...Karl Marx was the only first-rate economist to give 
Quesnay his due. 
36
 
 
  Through the concept of the circular flow Quesnay‟s influence extended and was 
recognized as an inspiration by Leontief in his work on input-output tables which in turn had 
their  origin in Marxian schemes of reproduction and central planning in the Soviet Union. 
Quesnay‟s influence was less among English classical economists (despite Smith‟s several 
favourable mentions of him) and even less among the neo-classical economists. And when  
the latter turned  their attention to him, they tended to disfigure his work out of all 
recognition. Samuelson (1982) did so when he introduced the assumption of equality of wage 
and marginal product of labor, dropped classes in favour of factors of production etc.  As 
Cartelier (2009, p. 443) writes, it is not then surprising that Samuelson came to the 
conclusion that “the Tableau économique has been an interesting footnote in the history of 
economic thought”. But Samuelson, singularly blind to nuance and history, is famous also for 
an even more egregious statement on Marx.  
 
                                                          
35
 Meek (p. xviii) in Kaczynski and Meek (1972). 
36
 Schumpeter (1980, p. 232).  
29 
 
 It is a testimony to the strength of the purely economic ideas that such continuity 
between Quesnay and Marx may be established despite the fact that their politics could not 
have been more different, estranged even, as they stood at the two antipodes of the political 
spectrum:  Quesnay with the defense of enlightened despotism and Marx with the  proletarian 
revolution. 
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